`snprintf()` is meant to protect against buffer overflows, but operating
on the buffer using its return value, possibly by calling it again, can
cause a buffer overflow, because it will return how many characters it
would have written if it had enough space even when it did not. In a
number of places, we repeatedly call snprintf() by successively
incrementing a buffer offset and decrementing a buffer length, by its
return value. This is a potentially unsafe usage of `snprintf()`
whenever the buffer length is reached. CodeQL complained about this.
To fix this, we introduce `kmem_scnprintf()`, which will return 0 when
the buffer is zero or the number of written characters, minus 1 to
exclude the NULL character, when the buffer was too small. In all other
cases, it behaves like snprintf(). The name is inspired by the Linux and
XNU kernels' `scnprintf()`. The implementation was written before I
thought to look at `scnprintf()` and had a good name for it, but it
turned out to have identical semantics to the Linux kernel version.
That lead to the name, `kmem_scnprintf()`.
CodeQL only catches this issue in loops, so repeated use of snprintf()
outside of a loop was not caught. As a result, a thorough audit of the
codebase was done to examine all instances of `snprintf()` usage for
potential problems and a few were caught. Fixes for them are included in
this patch.
Unfortunately, ZED is one of the places where `snprintf()` is
potentially used incorrectly. Since using `kmem_scnprintf()` in it would
require changing how it is linked, we modify its usage to make it safe,
no matter what buffer length is used. In addition, there was a bug in
the use of the return value where the NULL format character was not
being written by pwrite(). That has been fixed.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes#14098
Coverity made two complaints about this function. The first is that we
ignore the number of bytes read. The second is that we have a sizeof
mismatch.
On 64-bit systems, long is a 64-bit type. Paradoxically, the standard
says that hostid is 32-bit, yet is also a long type. On 64-bit big
endian systems, reading into the long would cause us to return 0 as our
hostid after the mask. This is wrong.
Also, if a partial read were to happen (it should not), we would return
a partial hostid, which is also wrong.
We introduce a uint32_t system_hostid stack variable and ensure that the
read is done into it and check the read's return value. Then we set the
value based on whether the read was successful. This should fix both of
coverity's complaints.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Neal Gompa <ngompa@datto.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu>
Closes#13968
This allows ZFS datasets to be delegated to a user/mount namespace
Within that namespace, only the delegated datasets are visible
Works very similarly to Zones/Jailes on other ZFS OSes
As a user:
```
$ unshare -Um
$ zfs list
no datasets available
$ echo $$
1234
```
As root:
```
# zfs list
NAME ZONED MOUNTPOINT
containers off /containers
containers/host off /containers/host
containers/host/child off /containers/host/child
containers/host/child/gchild off /containers/host/child/gchild
containers/unpriv on /unpriv
containers/unpriv/child on /unpriv/child
containers/unpriv/child/gchild on /unpriv/child/gchild
# zfs zone /proc/1234/ns/user containers/unpriv
```
Back to the user namespace:
```
$ zfs list
NAME USED AVAIL REFER MOUNTPOINT
containers 129M 47.8G 24K /containers
containers/unpriv 128M 47.8G 24K /unpriv
containers/unpriv/child 128M 47.8G 128M /unpriv/child
```
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Will Andrews <will.andrews@klarasystems.com>
Signed-off-by: Allan Jude <allan@klarasystems.com>
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Piotrowski <mateusz.piotrowski@klarasystems.com>
Co-authored-by: Allan Jude <allan@klarasystems.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateusz Piotrowski <mateusz.piotrowski@klarasystems.com>
Sponsored-by: Buddy <https://buddy.works>
Closes#12263
Exporting names this short can easily cause nasty collisions with user code.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: John Kennedy <john.kennedy@delphix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahelenia Ziemiańska <nabijaczleweli@nabijaczleweli.xyz>
Closes#12050
Fixes get_system_hostid() if it was set via the aforementioned sysctl
and simplifies the code a bit. The kernel and user-space must agree,
after all.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ahelenia Ziemiańska <nabijaczleweli@nabijaczleweli.xyz>
Closes#11879
Merge the actual implementations of getexecname() and slightly clean
up the FreeBSD one.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ahelenia Ziemiańska <nabijaczleweli@nabijaczleweli.xyz>
Closes#11879
All users did a freopen() on it. Even some non-users did!
This is point-less ‒ just open the mtab when needed
If I understand Solaris' getextmntent(3C) correctly, the non-user
freopen()s are very likely an odd, twisted vestigial tail of that ‒
but it's got a completely different calling convention and caching
semantics than any platform we support
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ahelenia Ziemiańska <nabijaczleweli@nabijaczleweli.xyz>
Closes#11868
As found by
git grep -E '(open|setmntent|pipe2?)\(' |
grep -vE '((zfs|zpool)_|fd|dl|lzc_re|pidfile_|g_)open\('
FreeBSD's pidfile_open() says nothing about the flags of the files it
opens, but we can't do anything about it anyway; the implementation does
open all files with O_CLOEXEC
Consider this output with zpool.d/media appended with
"pid=$$; (ls -l /proc/$pid/fd > /dev/tty)":
$ /sbin/zpool iostat -vc media
lrwx------ 0 -> /dev/pts/0
l-wx------ 1 -> 'pipe:[3278500]'
l-wx------ 2 -> /dev/null
lrwx------ 3 -> /dev/zfs
lr-x------ 4 -> /proc/31895/mounts
lrwx------ 5 -> /dev/zfs
lr-x------ 10 -> /usr/lib/zfs-linux/zpool.d/media
vs
$ ./zpool iostat -vc vendor,upath,iostat,media
lrwx------ 0 -> /dev/pts/0
l-wx------ 1 -> 'pipe:[3279887]'
l-wx------ 2 -> /dev/null
lr-x------ 10 -> /usr/lib/zfs-linux/zpool.d/media
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ahelenia Ziemiańska <nabijaczleweli@nabijaczleweli.xyz>
Closes#11866
FreeBSD has the concept of jails, a precursor to Solaris's zones, which
can be mapped to the required zones interface with relative ease. The
previous ZFS implementation in FreeBSD did so, and we should continue
to provide an appropriate implementation in OpenZFS as well.
Move lib/libspl/zone.c into platform code and adopt the correct
implementation for FreeBSD.
While here, prune unused code.
Reviewed-by: Alexander Motin <mav@FreeBSD.org>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Moeller <freqlabs@FreeBSD.org>
Closes#10851
Include the header with prototypes in the file that provides definitions
as well, to catch any mismatch between prototype and definition.
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@iXsystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Closes#10470
Factor Linux specific pieces out of libspl.
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Eric Fagan <sef@ixsystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Matt Macy <mmacy@FreeBSD.org>
Closes#9336
Richard Yao
Tino Reichardt
Will Andrews
наб
Ryan Moeller
Arvind Sankar
Matthew Macy