Contrary to initial testing we cannot rely on these kernels to
invalidate the per-cpu FPU state and restore the FPU registers.
Nor can we guarantee that the kernel won't modify the FPU state
which we saved in the task struck.
Therefore, the kfpu_begin() and kfpu_end() functions have been
updated to save and restore the FPU state using our own dedicated
per-cpu FPU state variables.
This has the additional advantage of allowing us to use the FPU
again in user threads. So we remove the code which was added to
use task queues to ensure some functions ran in kernel threads.
Reviewed-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Hutter <hutter2@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Issue #9346Closes#9403
When adding the SIMD compatibility code in e5db313 the decryption of a
dataset wrapping key was left in a user thread context. This was done
intentionally since it's a relatively infrequent operation. However,
this also meant that the encryption context templates were initialized
using the generic operations. Therefore, subsequent encryption and
decryption operations would use the generic implementation even when
executed by an I/O pipeline thread.
Resolve the issue by initializing the context templates in an I/O
pipeline thread. And by updating zio_do_crypt_uio() to dispatch any
encryption operations to a pipeline thread when called from the user
context. For example, when performing a read from the ARC.
Tested-by: Attila Fülöp <attila@fueloep.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Closes#9215Closes#9296
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net>
Closes#9238
This patch adds the ability for zinject to trigger decryption
and authentication faults in the ZIO and ARC layers. This
functionality is exposed via the new "decrypt" error type, which
may be provided for "data" object types.
This patch also refactors some of the core encryption / decryption
functions so that they have consistent prototypes, handle errors
consistently, and do not have unused arguments.
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes#7474
The on-disk format for encrypted datasets protects not only
the encrypted and authenticated blocks themselves, but also
the order and interpretation of these blocks. In order to
make this work while maintaining the ability to do raw
sends, the indirect bps maintain a secure checksum of all
the MACs in the block below it along with a few other
fields that determine how the data is interpreted.
Unfortunately, the current on-disk format erroneously
includes some fields which are not portable and thus cannot
support raw sends. It is not possible to easily work around
this issue due to a separate and much smaller bug which
causes indirect blocks for encrypted dnodes to not be
compressed, which conflicts with the previous bug. In
addition, the current code generates incompatible on-disk
formats on big endian and little endian systems due to an
issue with how block pointers are authenticated. Finally,
raw send streams do not currently include dn_maxblkid when
sending both the metadnode and normal dnodes which are
needed in order to ensure that we are correctly maintaining
the portable objset MAC.
This patch zero's out the offending fields when computing
the bp MAC and ensures that these MACs are always
calculated in little endian order (regardless of the host
system's byte order). This patch also registers an errata
for the old on-disk format, which we detect by adding a
"version" field to newly created DSL Crypto Keys. We allow
datasets without a version (version 0) to only be mounted
for read so that they can easily be migrated. We also now
include dn_maxblkid in raw send streams to ensure the MAC
can be maintained correctly.
This patch also contains minor bug fixes and cleanups.
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes#6845Closes#6864Closes#7052
* PBKDF2 implementation changed to OpenSSL implementation.
* HKDF implementation moved to its own file and tests
added to ensure correctness.
* Removed libzfs's now unnecessary dependency on libzpool
and libicp.
* Ztest can now create and test encrypted datasets. This is
currently disabled until issue #6526 is resolved, but
otherwise functions as advertised.
* Several small bug fixes discovered after enabling ztest
to run on encrypted datasets.
* Fixed coverity defects added by the encryption patch.
* Updated man pages for encrypted send / receive behavior.
* Fixed a bug where encrypted datasets could receive
DRR_WRITE_EMBEDDED records.
* Minor code cleanups / consolidation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes#494Closes#5769
Matthew Macy
Brian Behlendorf
Andrea Gelmini
Tom Caputi