Document zfs change-key caveats
As discussed on the 2019-01-07 OpenZFS Leadership Meeting, we need to be clear about the limitations of `zfs change-key`. Changing the user key does not change the master key, nor does it currently overwrite the old wrapped master key on disk. Reviewed-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Matt Ahrens <matt@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: George Melikov <mail@gmelikov.ru> Reviewed-by: Garrett Fields <ghfields@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Kjeld Schouten <kjeld@schouten-lebbing.nl> Signed-off-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com> Closes #9819
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.\" Copyright 2018 Nexenta Systems, Inc.
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.\" Copyright 2019 Joyent, Inc.
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.\"
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.Dd June 30, 2019
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.Dd January 13, 2020
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.Dt ZFS-LOAD-KEY 8
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.Os Linux
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.Sh NAME
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@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ Unloads the keys for all encryption roots in all imported pools.
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.Op Fl l
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.Ar filesystem
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.Xc
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Allows a user to change the encryption key used to access a dataset. This
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Changes the user's key (e.g. a passphrase) used to access a dataset. This
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command requires that the existing key for the dataset is already loaded into
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ZFS. This command may also be used to change the
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.Sy keylocation ,
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@ -166,6 +166,29 @@ will become one. Alternatively, the
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.Fl i
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flag may be provided to cause an encryption root to inherit the parent's key
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instead.
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.Pp
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If the user's key is compromised,
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.Nm zfs Cm change-key
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does not necessarily protect existing or newly-written data from attack.
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Newly-written data will continue to be encrypted with the same master key as
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the existing data. The master key is compromised if an attacker obtains a
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user key and the corresponding wrapped master key. Currently,
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.Nm zfs Cm change-key
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does not overwrite the previous wrapped master key on disk, so it is
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accessible via forensic analysis for an indeterminate length of time.
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.Pp
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In the event of a master key compromise, ideally the drives should be securely
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erased to remove all the old data (which is readable using the compromised
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master key), a new pool created, and the data copied back. This can be
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approximated in place by creating new datasets, copying the data
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(e.g. using
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.Nm zfs Cm send
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.Nm zfs Cm recv Ns
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), and then clearing the free space with
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.Nm zpool Cm trim --secure
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if supported by your hardware, otherwise
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.Nm zpool Cm initialize Ns .
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.Bl -tag -width "-r"
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.It Fl l
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Ensures the key is loaded before attempting to change the key. This is
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