2016-05-12 14:51:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* CDDL HEADER START
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
|
|
|
|
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
|
|
|
|
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
|
|
|
|
* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
|
|
|
|
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
|
|
|
|
* and limitations under the License.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
|
|
|
|
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
|
|
|
|
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
|
|
|
|
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
|
|
|
|
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* CDDL HEADER END
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
* Use is subject to license terms.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <modes/modes.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Utility routine to copy a buffer to a crypto_data structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Utility routine to apply the command, 'cmd', to the
|
|
|
|
* data in the uio structure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
crypto_uio_data(crypto_data_t *data, uchar_t *buf, int len, cmd_type_t cmd,
|
|
|
|
void *digest_ctx, void (*update)(void))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uio_t *uiop = data->cd_uio;
|
|
|
|
off_t offset = data->cd_offset;
|
|
|
|
size_t length = len;
|
|
|
|
uint_t vec_idx;
|
|
|
|
size_t cur_len;
|
|
|
|
uchar_t *datap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASSERT(data->cd_format == CRYPTO_DATA_UIO);
|
|
|
|
if (uiop->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) {
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Jump to the first iovec containing data to be
|
|
|
|
* processed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (vec_idx = 0; vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt &&
|
|
|
|
offset >= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len;
|
|
|
|
offset -= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
|
2016-05-12 14:51:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The caller specified an offset that is larger than
|
|
|
|
* the total size of the buffers it provided.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
|
|
|
|
cur_len = MIN(uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len -
|
|
|
|
offset, length);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
datap = (uchar_t *)(uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base +
|
|
|
|
offset);
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case COPY_FROM_DATA:
|
|
|
|
bcopy(datap, buf, cur_len);
|
|
|
|
buf += cur_len;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case COPY_TO_DATA:
|
|
|
|
bcopy(buf, datap, cur_len);
|
|
|
|
buf += cur_len;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case COMPARE_TO_DATA:
|
|
|
|
if (bcmp(datap, buf, cur_len))
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
buf += cur_len;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MD5_DIGEST_DATA:
|
|
|
|
case SHA1_DIGEST_DATA:
|
|
|
|
case SHA2_DIGEST_DATA:
|
|
|
|
case GHASH_DATA:
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
length -= cur_len;
|
|
|
|
vec_idx++;
|
|
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The end of the specified iovec's was reached but
|
|
|
|
* the length requested could not be processed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case COPY_TO_DATA:
|
|
|
|
data->cd_length = len;
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
crypto_put_output_data(uchar_t *buf, crypto_data_t *output, int len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (output->cd_format) {
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
|
|
|
|
if (output->cd_raw.iov_len < len) {
|
|
|
|
output->cd_length = len;
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bcopy(buf, (uchar_t *)(output->cd_raw.iov_base +
|
|
|
|
output->cd_offset), len);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO:
|
|
|
|
return (crypto_uio_data(output, buf, len,
|
|
|
|
COPY_TO_DATA, NULL, NULL));
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
crypto_update_iov(void *ctx, crypto_data_t *input, crypto_data_t *output,
|
|
|
|
int (*cipher)(void *, caddr_t, size_t, crypto_data_t *),
|
|
|
|
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint64_t *))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
common_ctx_t *common_ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (input->cd_miscdata != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
copy_block((uint8_t *)input->cd_miscdata,
|
|
|
|
&common_ctx->cc_iv[0]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (input->cd_raw.iov_len < input->cd_length)
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rv = (cipher)(ctx, input->cd_raw.iov_base + input->cd_offset,
|
|
|
|
input->cd_length, (input == output) ? NULL : output);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (rv);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
crypto_update_uio(void *ctx, crypto_data_t *input, crypto_data_t *output,
|
|
|
|
int (*cipher)(void *, caddr_t, size_t, crypto_data_t *),
|
|
|
|
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint64_t *))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
common_ctx_t *common_ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
uio_t *uiop = input->cd_uio;
|
|
|
|
off_t offset = input->cd_offset;
|
|
|
|
size_t length = input->cd_length;
|
|
|
|
uint_t vec_idx;
|
|
|
|
size_t cur_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (input->cd_miscdata != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
copy_block((uint8_t *)input->cd_miscdata,
|
|
|
|
&common_ctx->cc_iv[0]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (input->cd_uio->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) {
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Jump to the first iovec containing data to be
|
|
|
|
* processed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (vec_idx = 0; vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt &&
|
|
|
|
offset >= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len;
|
|
|
|
offset -= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len)
|
|
|
|
;
|
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux
This change incorporates three major pieces:
The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping
and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These
commands mostly involve manipulating the new
DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each
encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is
protected with a user's key. This level of indirection
allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting
their entire datasets. The change implements the new
subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and
"zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their
encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new
flags and properties have been added to allow dataset
creation and to make mounting and unmounting more
convenient.
The second piece of this patch provides the ability to
encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets.
Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message
Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers,
similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part
impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual
encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC
and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted
buffers and protected data.
The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted
sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw
encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly
as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset
on the receiving system is protected using the same
user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing
so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an
untrusted system without fear of data being
compromised.
Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #494
Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
|
2016-05-12 14:51:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The caller specified an offset that is larger than the
|
|
|
|
* total size of the buffers it provided.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now process the iovecs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
while (vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
|
|
|
|
cur_len = MIN(uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len -
|
|
|
|
offset, length);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
(cipher)(ctx, uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset,
|
|
|
|
cur_len, (input == output) ? NULL : output);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
length -= cur_len;
|
|
|
|
vec_idx++;
|
|
|
|
offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The end of the specified iovec's was reached but
|
|
|
|
* the length requested could not be processed, i.e.
|
|
|
|
* The caller requested to digest more data than it provided.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
}
|