zfs/module/os/freebsd/spl/spl_policy.c

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2007 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/mntent.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/policy.h>
#include <sys/zfs_vfsops.h>
#include <sys/zfs_znode.h>
int
secpolicy_nfs(cred_t *cr)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_NFS_DAEMON));
}
int
secpolicy_zfs(cred_t *cr)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT));
}
int
filesystem_limit/snapshot_limit is incorrectly enforced against root The filesystem_limit and snapshot_limit properties limit the number of filesystems or snapshots that can be created below this dataset. According to the manpage, "The limit is not enforced if the user is allowed to change the limit." Two types of users are allowed to change the limit: 1. Those that have been delegated the `filesystem_limit` or `snapshot_limit` permission, e.g. with `zfs allow USER filesystem_limit DATASET`. This works properly. 2. A user with elevated system privileges (e.g. root). This does not work - the root user will incorrectly get an error when trying to create a snapshot/filesystem, if it exceeds the `_limit` property. The problem is that `priv_policy_ns()` does not work if the `cred_t` is not that of the current process. This happens when `dsl_enforce_ds_ss_limits()` is called in syncing context (as part of a sync task's check func) to determine the permissions of the corresponding user process. This commit fixes the issue by passing the `task_struct` (typedef'ed as a `proc_t`) to syncing context, and then using `has_capability()` to determine if that process is privileged. Note that we still need to pass the `cred_t` to syncing context so that we can check if the user was delegated this permission with `zfs allow`. This problem only impacts Linux. Wrappers are added to FreeBSD but it continues to use `priv_check_cred()`, which works on arbitrary `cred_t`. Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <ryan@ixsystems.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Closes #8226 Closes #10545
2020-07-12 00:18:02 +00:00
secpolicy_zfs_proc(cred_t *cr, proc_t *proc)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT));
}
int
secpolicy_sys_config(cred_t *cr, int checkonly __unused)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_ZFS_POOL_CONFIG));
}
int
secpolicy_zinject(cred_t *cr)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_ZFS_INJECT));
}
int
secpolicy_fs_unmount(cred_t *cr, struct mount *vfsp __unused)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_UNMOUNT));
}
int
secpolicy_fs_owner(struct mount *mp, cred_t *cr)
{
if (zfs_super_owner) {
if (cr->cr_uid == mp->mnt_cred->cr_uid &&
cr->cr_prison == mp->mnt_cred->cr_prison) {
return (0);
}
}
return (EPERM);
}
/*
* This check is done in kern_link(), so we could just return 0 here.
*/
extern int hardlink_check_uid;
int
secpolicy_basic_link(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr)
{
if (!hardlink_check_uid)
return (0);
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_LINK));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(cred_t *cr)
{
return (EPERM);
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_remove(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr)
{
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_access(cred_t *cr, vnode_t *vp, uid_t owner, accmode_t accmode)
{
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
if ((accmode & VREAD) && spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_READ) != 0)
return (EACCES);
if ((accmode & VWRITE) &&
spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_WRITE) != 0) {
return (EACCES);
}
if (accmode & VEXEC) {
if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
if (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP) != 0)
return (EACCES);
} else {
if (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_EXEC) != 0)
return (EACCES);
}
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Like secpolicy_vnode_access() but we get the actual wanted mode and the
* current mode of the file, not the missing bits.
*/
int
secpolicy_vnode_access2(cred_t *cr, vnode_t *vp, uid_t owner,
accmode_t curmode, accmode_t wantmode)
{
accmode_t mode;
mode = ~curmode & wantmode;
if (mode == 0)
return (0);
return (secpolicy_vnode_access(cr, vp, owner, mode));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_any_access(cred_t *cr, vnode_t *vp, uid_t owner)
{
static int privs[] = {
PRIV_VFS_ADMIN,
PRIV_VFS_READ,
PRIV_VFS_WRITE,
PRIV_VFS_EXEC,
PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP
};
int i;
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
/* Same as secpolicy_vnode_setdac */
if (owner == cr->cr_uid)
return (0);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof (privs)/sizeof (int); i++) {
int priv;
switch (priv = privs[i]) {
case PRIV_VFS_EXEC:
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
continue;
break;
case PRIV_VFS_LOOKUP:
if (vp->v_type != VDIR)
continue;
break;
}
if (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, priv) == 0)
return (0);
}
return (EPERM);
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_setdac(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
{
if (owner == cr->cr_uid)
return (0);
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_setattr(cred_t *cr, vnode_t *vp, struct vattr *vap,
const struct vattr *ovap, int flags,
int unlocked_access(void *, int, cred_t *), void *node)
{
int mask = vap->va_mask;
int error;
if (mask & AT_SIZE) {
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
return (EISDIR);
error = unlocked_access(node, VWRITE, cr);
if (error)
return (error);
}
if (mask & AT_MODE) {
/*
* If not the owner of the file then check privilege
* for two things: the privilege to set the mode at all
* and, if we're setting setuid, we also need permissions
* to add the set-uid bit, if we're not the owner.
* In the specific case of creating a set-uid root
* file, we need even more permissions.
*/
error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(vp, cr, ovap->va_uid);
if (error)
return (error);
error = secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(vp, vap, ovap, cr);
if (error)
return (error);
} else {
vap->va_mode = ovap->va_mode;
}
if (mask & (AT_UID | AT_GID)) {
error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(vp, cr, ovap->va_uid);
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* To change the owner of a file, or change the group of
* a file to a group of which we are not a member, the
* caller must have privilege.
*/
if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) ||
((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid &&
!groupmember(vap->va_gid, cr))) {
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) != 0) {
error = spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN);
if (error)
return (error);
}
}
if (((mask & AT_UID) && vap->va_uid != ovap->va_uid) ||
((mask & AT_GID) && vap->va_gid != ovap->va_gid)) {
secpolicy_setid_clear(vap, vp, cr);
}
}
if (mask & (AT_ATIME | AT_MTIME)) {
/*
* From utimes(2):
* If times is NULL, ... The caller must be the owner of
* the file, have permission to write the file, or be the
* super-user.
* If times is non-NULL, ... The caller must be the owner of
* the file or be the super-user.
*/
error = secpolicy_vnode_setdac(vp, cr, ovap->va_uid);
if (error && (vap->va_vaflags & VA_UTIMES_NULL))
error = unlocked_access(node, VWRITE, cr);
if (error)
return (error);
}
return (0);
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_create_gid(cred_t *cr)
{
return (EPERM);
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr, gid_t gid)
{
if (groupmember(gid, cr))
return (0);
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_SETGID));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(znode_t *zp, cred_t *cr,
boolean_t issuidroot __unused)
{
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(ZTOV(zp)->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID));
}
void
secpolicy_setid_clear(struct vattr *vap, vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr)
{
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return;
if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0) {
if (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_RETAINSUGID)) {
vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE;
vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
}
}
}
int
secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(vnode_t *vp, struct vattr *vap,
const struct vattr *ovap, cred_t *cr)
{
int error;
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
/*
* Privileged processes may set the sticky bit on non-directories,
* as well as set the setgid bit on a file with a group that the process
* is not a member of. Both of these are allowed in jail(8).
*/
if (vp->v_type != VDIR && (vap->va_mode & S_ISTXT)) {
if (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_STICKYFILE))
return (EFTYPE);
}
/*
* Check for privilege if attempting to set the
* group-id bit.
*/
if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISGID) != 0) {
error = secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(vp, cr, ovap->va_gid);
if (error)
return (error);
}
/*
* Deny setting setuid if we are not the file owner.
*/
if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISUID) && ovap->va_uid != cr->cr_uid) {
error = spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_ADMIN);
if (error)
return (error);
}
return (0);
}
int
secpolicy_fs_mount(cred_t *cr, vnode_t *mvp, struct mount *vfsp)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_owner(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
{
if (owner == cr->cr_uid)
return (0);
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
/* XXX: vfs_suser()? */
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_OWNER));
}
int
secpolicy_vnode_chown(vnode_t *vp, cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
{
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_CHOWN));
}
void
secpolicy_fs_mount_clearopts(cred_t *cr, struct mount *vfsp)
{
if (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_MOUNT_NONUSER) != 0) {
MNT_ILOCK(vfsp);
vfsp->vfs_flag |= VFS_NOSETUID | MNT_USER;
vfs_clearmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_SETUID);
vfs_setmntopt(vfsp, MNTOPT_NOSETUID, NULL, 0);
MNT_IUNLOCK(vfsp);
}
}
/*
* Check privileges for setting xvattr attributes
*/
int
secpolicy_xvattr(vnode_t *vp, xvattr_t *xvap, uid_t owner, cred_t *cr,
vtype_t vtype)
{
if (secpolicy_fs_owner(vp->v_mount, cr) == 0)
return (0);
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_VFS_SYSFLAGS));
}
int
secpolicy_smb(cred_t *cr)
{
return (spl_priv_check_cred(cr, PRIV_NETSMB));
}