zfs/module/icp/core/kcf_prov_lib.c

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/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
* or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
* and limitations under the License.
*
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*/
#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
#include <modes/modes.h>
#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
/*
* Utility routine to copy a buffer to a crypto_data structure.
*/
/*
* Utility routine to apply the command, 'cmd', to the
* data in the uio structure.
*/
int
crypto_uio_data(crypto_data_t *data, uchar_t *buf, int len, cmd_type_t cmd,
void *digest_ctx, void (*update)(void))
{
uio_t *uiop = data->cd_uio;
off_t offset = data->cd_offset;
size_t length = len;
uint_t vec_idx;
size_t cur_len;
uchar_t *datap;
ASSERT(data->cd_format == CRYPTO_DATA_UIO);
if (uiop->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) {
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
}
/*
* Jump to the first iovec containing data to be
* processed.
*/
for (vec_idx = 0; vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt &&
offset >= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len;
offset -= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len)
;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
/*
* The caller specified an offset that is larger than
* the total size of the buffers it provided.
*/
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
}
while (vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
cur_len = MIN(uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len -
offset, length);
datap = (uchar_t *)(uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base +
offset);
switch (cmd) {
case COPY_FROM_DATA:
bcopy(datap, buf, cur_len);
buf += cur_len;
break;
case COPY_TO_DATA:
bcopy(buf, datap, cur_len);
buf += cur_len;
break;
case COMPARE_TO_DATA:
if (bcmp(datap, buf, cur_len))
return (CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
buf += cur_len;
break;
case MD5_DIGEST_DATA:
case SHA1_DIGEST_DATA:
case SHA2_DIGEST_DATA:
case GHASH_DATA:
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
}
length -= cur_len;
vec_idx++;
offset = 0;
}
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
/*
* The end of the specified iovec's was reached but
* the length requested could not be processed.
*/
switch (cmd) {
case COPY_TO_DATA:
data->cd_length = len;
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
default:
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
}
}
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
}
int
crypto_put_output_data(uchar_t *buf, crypto_data_t *output, int len)
{
switch (output->cd_format) {
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
if (output->cd_raw.iov_len < len) {
output->cd_length = len;
return (CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
}
bcopy(buf, (uchar_t *)(output->cd_raw.iov_base +
output->cd_offset), len);
break;
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO:
return (crypto_uio_data(output, buf, len,
COPY_TO_DATA, NULL, NULL));
default:
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
}
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
}
int
crypto_update_iov(void *ctx, crypto_data_t *input, crypto_data_t *output,
int (*cipher)(void *, caddr_t, size_t, crypto_data_t *),
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint64_t *))
{
common_ctx_t *common_ctx = ctx;
int rv;
ASSERT(input != output);
if (input->cd_miscdata != NULL) {
copy_block((uint8_t *)input->cd_miscdata,
&common_ctx->cc_iv[0]);
}
if (input->cd_raw.iov_len < input->cd_length)
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
rv = (cipher)(ctx, input->cd_raw.iov_base + input->cd_offset,
input->cd_length, output);
return (rv);
}
int
crypto_update_uio(void *ctx, crypto_data_t *input, crypto_data_t *output,
int (*cipher)(void *, caddr_t, size_t, crypto_data_t *),
void (*copy_block)(uint8_t *, uint64_t *))
{
common_ctx_t *common_ctx = ctx;
uio_t *uiop = input->cd_uio;
off_t offset = input->cd_offset;
size_t length = input->cd_length;
uint_t vec_idx;
size_t cur_len;
ASSERT(input != output);
if (input->cd_miscdata != NULL) {
copy_block((uint8_t *)input->cd_miscdata,
&common_ctx->cc_iv[0]);
}
if (input->cd_uio->uio_segflg != UIO_SYSSPACE) {
return (CRYPTO_ARGUMENTS_BAD);
}
/*
* Jump to the first iovec containing data to be
* processed.
*/
for (vec_idx = 0; vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt &&
offset >= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len;
offset -= uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx++].iov_len)
;
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
/*
* The caller specified an offset that is larger than the
* total size of the buffers it provided.
*/
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
}
/*
* Now process the iovecs.
*/
while (vec_idx < uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
cur_len = MIN(uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_len -
offset, length);
int rv = (cipher)(ctx, uiop->uio_iov[vec_idx].iov_base + offset,
cur_len, output);
if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) {
return (rv);
}
length -= cur_len;
vec_idx++;
offset = 0;
}
if (vec_idx == uiop->uio_iovcnt && length > 0) {
/*
* The end of the specified iovec's was reached but
* the length requested could not be processed, i.e.
* The caller requested to digest more data than it provided.
*/
return (CRYPTO_DATA_LEN_RANGE);
}
return (CRYPTO_SUCCESS);
}