zfs/module/icp/algs/modes/modes.c

197 lines
5.2 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
* You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
*
* You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
* or https://opensource.org/licenses/CDDL-1.0.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions
* and limitations under the License.
*
* When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
* file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
* If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
* fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
* information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Use is subject to license terms.
*/
#include <sys/zfs_context.h>
#include <modes/modes.h>
#include <sys/crypto/common.h>
#include <sys/crypto/impl.h>
/*
* Initialize by setting iov_or_mp to point to the current iovec or mp,
* and by setting current_offset to an offset within the current iovec or mp.
*/
void
crypto_init_ptrs(crypto_data_t *out, void **iov_or_mp, offset_t *current_offset)
{
offset_t offset;
switch (out->cd_format) {
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW:
*current_offset = out->cd_offset;
break;
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: {
zfs_uio_t *uiop = out->cd_uio;
uint_t vec_idx;
offset = out->cd_offset;
offset = zfs_uio_index_at_offset(uiop, offset, &vec_idx);
*current_offset = offset;
*iov_or_mp = (void *)(uintptr_t)vec_idx;
break;
}
} /* end switch */
}
/*
* Get pointers for where in the output to copy a block of encrypted or
* decrypted data. The iov_or_mp argument stores a pointer to the current
* iovec or mp, and offset stores an offset into the current iovec or mp.
*/
void
crypto_get_ptrs(crypto_data_t *out, void **iov_or_mp, offset_t *current_offset,
uint8_t **out_data_1, size_t *out_data_1_len, uint8_t **out_data_2,
size_t amt)
{
offset_t offset;
switch (out->cd_format) {
case CRYPTO_DATA_RAW: {
iovec_t *iov;
offset = *current_offset;
iov = &out->cd_raw;
if ((offset + amt) <= iov->iov_len) {
/* one block fits */
*out_data_1 = (uint8_t *)iov->iov_base + offset;
*out_data_1_len = amt;
*out_data_2 = NULL;
*current_offset = offset + amt;
}
break;
}
case CRYPTO_DATA_UIO: {
zfs_uio_t *uio = out->cd_uio;
offset_t offset;
uint_t vec_idx;
uint8_t *p;
uint64_t iov_len;
void *iov_base;
offset = *current_offset;
vec_idx = (uintptr_t)(*iov_or_mp);
zfs_uio_iov_at_index(uio, vec_idx, &iov_base, &iov_len);
p = (uint8_t *)iov_base + offset;
*out_data_1 = p;
if (offset + amt <= iov_len) {
/* can fit one block into this iov */
*out_data_1_len = amt;
*out_data_2 = NULL;
*current_offset = offset + amt;
} else {
/* one block spans two iovecs */
*out_data_1_len = iov_len - offset;
if (vec_idx == zfs_uio_iovcnt(uio)) {
*out_data_2 = NULL;
return;
}
vec_idx++;
zfs_uio_iov_at_index(uio, vec_idx, &iov_base, &iov_len);
*out_data_2 = (uint8_t *)iov_base;
*current_offset = amt - *out_data_1_len;
}
*iov_or_mp = (void *)(uintptr_t)vec_idx;
break;
}
} /* end switch */
}
void
crypto_free_mode_ctx(void *ctx)
{
common_ctx_t *common_ctx = (common_ctx_t *)ctx;
switch (common_ctx->cc_flags &
(ECB_MODE|CBC_MODE|CTR_MODE|CCM_MODE|GCM_MODE|GMAC_MODE)) {
case ECB_MODE:
kmem_free(common_ctx, sizeof (ecb_ctx_t));
break;
case CBC_MODE:
kmem_free(common_ctx, sizeof (cbc_ctx_t));
break;
case CTR_MODE:
kmem_free(common_ctx, sizeof (ctr_ctx_t));
break;
case CCM_MODE:
if (((ccm_ctx_t *)ctx)->ccm_pt_buf != NULL)
vmem_free(((ccm_ctx_t *)ctx)->ccm_pt_buf,
((ccm_ctx_t *)ctx)->ccm_data_len);
kmem_free(ctx, sizeof (ccm_ctx_t));
break;
case GCM_MODE:
case GMAC_MODE:
gcm_clear_ctx((gcm_ctx_t *)ctx);
kmem_free(ctx, sizeof (gcm_ctx_t));
}
}
icp: Prevent compilers from optimizing away memset() in gcm_clear_ctx() The recently merged f58e513f7408f353bf0151fdaf235d4e062e8950 was intended to zero sensitive data before exit from encryption functions to harden the code against theoretical information leaks. Unfortunately, the method by which it did that is optimized away by the compiler, so some information still leaks. This was confirmed by counting function calls in disassembly. After studying how the OpenBSD, FreeBSD and Linux kernels handle this, and looking at our disassembly, I decided on a two-factor approach to protect us from compiler dead store elimination passes. The first factor is to stop trying to inline gcm_clear_ctx(). GCC does not actually inline it in the first place, and testing suggests that dead store elimination passes appear to become more powerful in a bad way when inlining is forced, so we recognize that and move gcm_clear_ctx() to a C file. The second factor is to implement an explicit_memset() function based on the technique used by `secure_zero_memory()` in FreeBSD's blake2 implementation, which coincidentally is functionally identical to the one used by Linux. The source for this appears to be a LLVM bug: https://llvm.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=15495 Unlike both FreeBSD and Linux, we explicitly avoid the inline keyword, based on my observations that GCC's dead store elimination pass becomes more powerful when inlining is forced, under the assumption that it will be equally powerful when the compiler does decide to inline function calls. Disassembly of GCC's output confirms that all 6 memset() calls are executed with this patch applied. Reviewed-by: Attila Fülöp <attila@fueloep.org> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <richard.yao@alumni.stonybrook.edu> Closes #14544
2023-03-01 01:28:50 +00:00
static void *
explicit_memset(void *s, int c, size_t n)
{
memset(s, c, n);
__asm__ __volatile__("" :: "r"(s) : "memory");
return (s);
}
/*
* Clear sensitive data in the context and free allocated memory.
*
* ctx->gcm_remainder may contain a plaintext remainder. ctx->gcm_H and
* ctx->gcm_Htable contain the hash sub key which protects authentication.
* ctx->gcm_pt_buf contains the plaintext result of decryption.
*
* Although extremely unlikely, ctx->gcm_J0 and ctx->gcm_tmp could be used for
* a known plaintext attack, they consist of the IV and the first and last
* counter respectively. If they should be cleared is debatable.
*/
void
gcm_clear_ctx(gcm_ctx_t *ctx)
{
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_remainder, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_remainder));
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_H, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_H));
#if defined(CAN_USE_GCM_ASM)
if (ctx->gcm_use_avx == B_TRUE) {
ASSERT3P(ctx->gcm_Htable, !=, NULL);
memset(ctx->gcm_Htable, 0, ctx->gcm_htab_len);
kmem_free(ctx->gcm_Htable, ctx->gcm_htab_len);
}
#endif
if (ctx->gcm_pt_buf != NULL) {
memset(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, 0, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
vmem_free(ctx->gcm_pt_buf, ctx->gcm_pt_buf_len);
}
/* Optional */
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_J0, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_J0));
explicit_memset(ctx->gcm_tmp, 0, sizeof (ctx->gcm_tmp));
}