zfs/module/spl/spl-generic.c

749 lines
19 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*****************************************************************************\
* Copyright (C) 2007-2010 Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.
* Copyright (C) 2007 The Regents of the University of California.
* Produced at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (cf, DISCLAIMER).
* Written by Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>.
* UCRL-CODE-235197
*
* This file is part of the SPL, Solaris Porting Layer.
* For details, see <http://zfsonlinux.org/>.
*
* The SPL is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version.
*
* The SPL is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
* with the SPL. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*****************************************************************************
* Solaris Porting Layer (SPL) Generic Implementation.
\*****************************************************************************/
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <sys/systeminfo.h>
#include <sys/vmsystm.h>
#include <sys/kobj.h>
#include <sys/kmem.h>
#include <sys/kmem_cache.h>
#include <sys/vmem.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
#include <sys/rwlock.h>
2009-01-05 23:08:03 +00:00
#include <sys/taskq.h>
Add Thread Specific Data (TSD) Implementation Thread specific data has implemented using a hash table, this avoids the need to add a member to the task structure and allows maximum portability between kernels. This implementation has been optimized to keep the tsd_set() and tsd_get() times as small as possible. The majority of the entries in the hash table are for specific tsd entries. These entries are hashed by the product of their key and pid because by design the key and pid are guaranteed to be unique. Their product also has the desirable properly that it will be uniformly distributed over the hash bins providing neither the pid nor key is zero. Under linux the zero pid is always the init process and thus won't be used, and this implementation is careful to never to assign a zero key. By default the hash table is sized to 512 bins which is expected to be sufficient for light to moderate usage of thread specific data. The hash table contains two additional type of entries. They first type is entry is called a 'key' entry and it is added to the hash during tsd_create(). It is used to store the address of the destructor function and it is used as an anchor point. All tsd entries which use the same key will be linked to this entry. This is used during tsd_destory() to quickly call the destructor function for all tsd associated with the key. The 'key' entry may be looked up with tsd_hash_search() by passing the key you wish to lookup and DTOR_PID constant as the pid. The second type of entry is called a 'pid' entry and it is added to the hash the first time a process set a key. The 'pid' entry is also used as an anchor and all tsd for the process will be linked to it. This list is using during tsd_exit() to ensure all registered destructors are run for the process. The 'pid' entry may be looked up with tsd_hash_search() by passing the PID_KEY constant as the key, and the process pid. Note that tsd_exit() is called by thread_exit() so if your using the Solaris thread API you should not need to call tsd_exit() directly.
2010-11-30 17:51:46 +00:00
#include <sys/tsd.h>
#include <sys/zmod.h>
#include <sys/debug.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/kstat.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
random_get_pseudo_bytes() need not provide cryptographic strength entropy Perf profiling of dd on a zvol revealed that my system spent 3.16% of its time in random_get_pseudo_bytes(). No SPL consumers need cryptographic strength entropy, so we can reduce our overhead by changing the implementation to utilize a fast PRNG. The Linux kernel did not export a suitable PRNG function until it exported get_random_int() in Linux 3.10. While we could implement an autotools check so that we use it when it is available or even try to access the symbol on older kernels where it is not exported using the fact that it is exported on newer ones as justification, we can instead implement our own pseudo-random data generator. For this purpose, I have written one based on a 128-bit pseudo-random number generator proposed in a paper by Sebastiano Vigna that itself was based on work by the late George Marsaglia. http://vigna.di.unimi.it/ftp/papers/xorshiftplus.pdf Profiling the same benchmark with an earlier variant of this patch that used a slightly different generator (roughly same number of instructions) by the same author showed that time spent in random_get_pseudo_bytes() dropped to 0.06%. That is a factor of 50 improvement. This particular generator algorithm is also well known to be fast: http://xorshift.di.unimi.it/#speed The benchmark numbers there state that it runs at 1.12ns/64-bits or 7.14 GBps of throughput on an Intel Core i7-4770 in what is presumably a single-threaded context. Using it in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in the manner I have will probably not reach that level of performance, but it should be fairly high and many times higher than the Linux `get_random_bytes()` function that we use now, which runs at 16.3 MB/s on my Intel Xeon E3-1276v3 processor when measured by using dd on /dev/urandom. Also, putting this generator's seed into per-CPU variables allows us to eliminate overhead from both spin locks and CPU memory barriers, which is NUMA friendly. We could have alternatively modified consumers to use something like `gethrtime() % 3` as suggested by both Matthew Ahrens and Tim Chase, but that has a few potential problems that this approach avoids: 1. Switching to `gethrtime() % 3` in hot code paths today requires diverging from illumos-gate and does nothing about potential future patches from illumos-gate that call our slow `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in different hot code paths. Reimplementing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with a per-CPU PRNG avoids both of those things entirely, which means less work for us in the future. 2. Looking at the code that implements `gethrtime()`, I think it is unlikely to be faster than this per-CPU PRNG implementation of `random_get_pseudo_bytes()`. It would be best to go with something fast now so that there is no point in revisiting this from a performance perspective. 3. `gethrtime() % 3` can vary in behavior from system to system based on kernel version, architecture and clock source. In comparison, this per-CPU PRNG is about ~40 lines of code in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` that should behave consistently across all systems regardless of kernel version, system architecture or machine clock source. It is unlikely that we would ever need to revisit this per-CPU PRNG while the same cannot be said for `gethrtime() % 3`. 4. `gethrtime()` uses CPU memory barriers and maybe atomic instructions depending on the clock source, so replacing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with `gethrtime()` in hot code paths could still require a future person working on NUMA scalability to reimplement it anyway while this per-CPU PRNG would not by virtue of using neither CPU memory barriers nor atomic instructions. Note that I did not check various clock sources for the presence of atomic instructions. There is simply too much code to read and given the drawbacks versus this per-cpu PRNG, there is no point in being certain. 5. I have heard of instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers caused problems for HPC code in ways that took more than a year to identify and were remedied by switching to a higher quality source of pseudo-random numbers. While filesystems are different than HPC code, I do not think it is impossible for us to have instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems. Opting for a well studied PRNG algorithm that passes tests for statistical randomness over changing callers to use `gethrtime() % 3` bypasses the need to think about both whether poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems and the statistical quality of numbers from `gethrtime() % 3`. 6. `gethrtime()` calls `getrawmonotonic()`, which uses seqlocks. This is probably not a huge issue, but anyone using kgdb would never be able to step through a seqlock critical section, which is not a problem either now or with the per-CPU PRNG: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seqlock The only downside that I can see is that this code's memory requirement is O(N) where N is NR_CPUS, versus the current code and `gethrtime() % 3`, which are O(1), but that should not be a problem. The seeds will use 64KB of memory at the high end (i.e `NR_CPU == 4096`) and 16 bytes of memory at the low end (i.e. `NR_CPU == 1`). In either case, we should only use a few hundred bytes of code for text, especially since `spl_rand_jump()` should be inlined into `spl_random_init()`, which should be removed during early boot as part of "Freeing unused kernel memory". In either case, the memory requirements are minuscule. Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com> Closes #372
2014-07-11 22:36:28 +00:00
#include <sys/disp.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/math64_compat.h>
#include <linux/proc_compat.h>
char spl_version[32] = "SPL v" SPL_META_VERSION "-" SPL_META_RELEASE;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(spl_version);
unsigned long spl_hostid = 0;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(spl_hostid);
module_param(spl_hostid, ulong, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(spl_hostid, "The system hostid.");
proc_t p0 = { 0 };
EXPORT_SYMBOL(p0);
random_get_pseudo_bytes() need not provide cryptographic strength entropy Perf profiling of dd on a zvol revealed that my system spent 3.16% of its time in random_get_pseudo_bytes(). No SPL consumers need cryptographic strength entropy, so we can reduce our overhead by changing the implementation to utilize a fast PRNG. The Linux kernel did not export a suitable PRNG function until it exported get_random_int() in Linux 3.10. While we could implement an autotools check so that we use it when it is available or even try to access the symbol on older kernels where it is not exported using the fact that it is exported on newer ones as justification, we can instead implement our own pseudo-random data generator. For this purpose, I have written one based on a 128-bit pseudo-random number generator proposed in a paper by Sebastiano Vigna that itself was based on work by the late George Marsaglia. http://vigna.di.unimi.it/ftp/papers/xorshiftplus.pdf Profiling the same benchmark with an earlier variant of this patch that used a slightly different generator (roughly same number of instructions) by the same author showed that time spent in random_get_pseudo_bytes() dropped to 0.06%. That is a factor of 50 improvement. This particular generator algorithm is also well known to be fast: http://xorshift.di.unimi.it/#speed The benchmark numbers there state that it runs at 1.12ns/64-bits or 7.14 GBps of throughput on an Intel Core i7-4770 in what is presumably a single-threaded context. Using it in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in the manner I have will probably not reach that level of performance, but it should be fairly high and many times higher than the Linux `get_random_bytes()` function that we use now, which runs at 16.3 MB/s on my Intel Xeon E3-1276v3 processor when measured by using dd on /dev/urandom. Also, putting this generator's seed into per-CPU variables allows us to eliminate overhead from both spin locks and CPU memory barriers, which is NUMA friendly. We could have alternatively modified consumers to use something like `gethrtime() % 3` as suggested by both Matthew Ahrens and Tim Chase, but that has a few potential problems that this approach avoids: 1. Switching to `gethrtime() % 3` in hot code paths today requires diverging from illumos-gate and does nothing about potential future patches from illumos-gate that call our slow `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in different hot code paths. Reimplementing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with a per-CPU PRNG avoids both of those things entirely, which means less work for us in the future. 2. Looking at the code that implements `gethrtime()`, I think it is unlikely to be faster than this per-CPU PRNG implementation of `random_get_pseudo_bytes()`. It would be best to go with something fast now so that there is no point in revisiting this from a performance perspective. 3. `gethrtime() % 3` can vary in behavior from system to system based on kernel version, architecture and clock source. In comparison, this per-CPU PRNG is about ~40 lines of code in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` that should behave consistently across all systems regardless of kernel version, system architecture or machine clock source. It is unlikely that we would ever need to revisit this per-CPU PRNG while the same cannot be said for `gethrtime() % 3`. 4. `gethrtime()` uses CPU memory barriers and maybe atomic instructions depending on the clock source, so replacing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with `gethrtime()` in hot code paths could still require a future person working on NUMA scalability to reimplement it anyway while this per-CPU PRNG would not by virtue of using neither CPU memory barriers nor atomic instructions. Note that I did not check various clock sources for the presence of atomic instructions. There is simply too much code to read and given the drawbacks versus this per-cpu PRNG, there is no point in being certain. 5. I have heard of instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers caused problems for HPC code in ways that took more than a year to identify and were remedied by switching to a higher quality source of pseudo-random numbers. While filesystems are different than HPC code, I do not think it is impossible for us to have instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems. Opting for a well studied PRNG algorithm that passes tests for statistical randomness over changing callers to use `gethrtime() % 3` bypasses the need to think about both whether poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems and the statistical quality of numbers from `gethrtime() % 3`. 6. `gethrtime()` calls `getrawmonotonic()`, which uses seqlocks. This is probably not a huge issue, but anyone using kgdb would never be able to step through a seqlock critical section, which is not a problem either now or with the per-CPU PRNG: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seqlock The only downside that I can see is that this code's memory requirement is O(N) where N is NR_CPUS, versus the current code and `gethrtime() % 3`, which are O(1), but that should not be a problem. The seeds will use 64KB of memory at the high end (i.e `NR_CPU == 4096`) and 16 bytes of memory at the low end (i.e. `NR_CPU == 1`). In either case, we should only use a few hundred bytes of code for text, especially since `spl_rand_jump()` should be inlined into `spl_random_init()`, which should be removed during early boot as part of "Freeing unused kernel memory". In either case, the memory requirements are minuscule. Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com> Closes #372
2014-07-11 22:36:28 +00:00
/*
* Xorshift Pseudo Random Number Generator based on work by Sebastiano Vigna
*
* "Further scramblings of Marsaglia's xorshift generators"
* http://vigna.di.unimi.it/ftp/papers/xorshiftplus.pdf
*
* random_get_pseudo_bytes() is an API function on Illumos whose sole purpose
* is to provide bytes containing random numbers. It is mapped to /dev/urandom
* on Illumos, which uses a "FIPS 186-2 algorithm". No user of the SPL's
* random_get_pseudo_bytes() needs bytes that are of cryptographic quality, so
* we can implement it using a fast PRNG that we seed using Linux' actual
* equivalent to random_get_pseudo_bytes(). We do this by providing each CPU
* with an independent seed so that all calls to random_get_pseudo_bytes() are
* free of atomic instructions.
*
* A consequence of using a fast PRNG is that using random_get_pseudo_bytes()
* to generate words larger than 128 bits will paradoxically be limited to
* `2^128 - 1` possibilities. This is because we have a sequence of `2^128 - 1`
* 128-bit words and selecting the first will implicitly select the second. If
* a caller finds this behavior undesireable, random_get_bytes() should be used
* instead.
*
* XXX: Linux interrupt handlers that trigger within the critical section
* formed by `s[1] = xp[1];` and `xp[0] = s[0];` and call this function will
* see the same numbers. Nothing in the code currently calls this in an
* interrupt handler, so this is considered to be okay. If that becomes a
* problem, we could create a set of per-cpu variables for interrupt handlers
* and use them when in_interrupt() from linux/preempt_mask.h evaluates to
* true.
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(uint64_t[2], spl_pseudo_entropy);
/*
* spl_rand_next()/spl_rand_jump() are copied from the following CC-0 licensed
* file:
*
* http://xorshift.di.unimi.it/xorshift128plus.c
*/
static inline uint64_t
spl_rand_next(uint64_t *s) {
uint64_t s1 = s[0];
const uint64_t s0 = s[1];
s[0] = s0;
s1 ^= s1 << 23; // a
s[1] = s1 ^ s0 ^ (s1 >> 18) ^ (s0 >> 5); // b, c
return (s[1] + s0);
}
static inline void
spl_rand_jump(uint64_t *s) {
static const uint64_t JUMP[] = { 0x8a5cd789635d2dff, 0x121fd2155c472f96 };
uint64_t s0 = 0;
uint64_t s1 = 0;
int i, b;
for(i = 0; i < sizeof JUMP / sizeof *JUMP; i++)
for(b = 0; b < 64; b++) {
if (JUMP[i] & 1ULL << b) {
s0 ^= s[0];
s1 ^= s[1];
}
(void) spl_rand_next(s);
}
s[0] = s0;
s[1] = s1;
}
int
random_get_pseudo_bytes(uint8_t *ptr, size_t len)
{
uint64_t *xp, s[2];
ASSERT(ptr);
xp = get_cpu_var(spl_pseudo_entropy);
s[0] = xp[0];
s[1] = xp[1];
while (len) {
union {
uint64_t ui64;
uint8_t byte[sizeof (uint64_t)];
}entropy;
int i = MIN(len, sizeof (uint64_t));
len -= i;
entropy.ui64 = spl_rand_next(s);
while (i--)
*ptr++ = entropy.byte[i];
}
xp[0] = s[0];
xp[1] = s[1];
put_cpu_var(spl_pseudo_entropy);
return (0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_get_pseudo_bytes);
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
/*
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
* Support 64/64 => 64 division on a 32-bit platform. While the kernel
* provides a div64_u64() function for this we do not use it because the
* implementation is flawed. There are cases which return incorrect
* results as late as linux-2.6.35. Until this is fixed upstream the
* spl must provide its own implementation.
*
* This implementation is a slightly modified version of the algorithm
* proposed by the book 'Hacker's Delight'. The original source can be
* found here and is available for use without restriction.
*
* http://www.hackersdelight.org/HDcode/newCode/divDouble.c
*/
/*
* Calculate number of leading of zeros for a 64-bit value.
*/
static int
nlz64(uint64_t x) {
register int n = 0;
if (x == 0)
return 64;
if (x <= 0x00000000FFFFFFFFULL) {n = n + 32; x = x << 32;}
if (x <= 0x0000FFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {n = n + 16; x = x << 16;}
if (x <= 0x00FFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {n = n + 8; x = x << 8;}
if (x <= 0x0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {n = n + 4; x = x << 4;}
if (x <= 0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {n = n + 2; x = x << 2;}
if (x <= 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {n = n + 1;}
return n;
}
/*
* Newer kernels have a div_u64() function but we define our own
* to simplify portibility between kernel versions.
*/
static inline uint64_t
__div_u64(uint64_t u, uint32_t v)
{
(void) do_div(u, v);
return u;
}
/*
* Implementation of 64-bit unsigned division for 32-bit machines.
*
* First the procedure takes care of the case in which the divisor is a
* 32-bit quantity. There are two subcases: (1) If the left half of the
* dividend is less than the divisor, one execution of do_div() is all that
* is required (overflow is not possible). (2) Otherwise it does two
* divisions, using the grade school method.
*/
uint64_t
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
__udivdi3(uint64_t u, uint64_t v)
{
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
uint64_t u0, u1, v1, q0, q1, k;
int n;
if (v >> 32 == 0) { // If v < 2**32:
if (u >> 32 < v) { // If u/v cannot overflow,
return __div_u64(u, v); // just do one division.
} else { // If u/v would overflow:
u1 = u >> 32; // Break u into two halves.
u0 = u & 0xFFFFFFFF;
q1 = __div_u64(u1, v); // First quotient digit.
k = u1 - q1 * v; // First remainder, < v.
u0 += (k << 32);
q0 = __div_u64(u0, v); // Seconds quotient digit.
return (q1 << 32) + q0;
}
} else { // If v >= 2**32:
n = nlz64(v); // 0 <= n <= 31.
v1 = (v << n) >> 32; // Normalize divisor, MSB is 1.
u1 = u >> 1; // To ensure no overflow.
q1 = __div_u64(u1, v1); // Get quotient from
q0 = (q1 << n) >> 31; // Undo normalization and
// division of u by 2.
if (q0 != 0) // Make q0 correct or
q0 = q0 - 1; // too small by 1.
if ((u - q0 * v) >= v)
q0 = q0 + 1; // Now q0 is correct.
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
return q0;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__udivdi3);
/*
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
* Implementation of 64-bit signed division for 32-bit machines.
*/
int64_t
__divdi3(int64_t u, int64_t v)
{
int64_t q, t;
q = __udivdi3(abs64(u), abs64(v));
t = (u ^ v) >> 63; // If u, v have different
return (q ^ t) - t; // signs, negate q.
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__divdi3);
/*
* Implementation of 64-bit unsigned modulo for 32-bit machines.
*/
uint64_t
__umoddi3(uint64_t dividend, uint64_t divisor)
{
return (dividend - (divisor * __udivdi3(dividend, divisor)));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__umoddi3);
Add __divdi3(), remove __udivdi3() kernel dependency Up until now no SPL consumer attempted to perform signed 64-bit division so there was no need to support this. That has now changed so I adding 64-bit division support for 32-bit platforms. The signed implementation is based on the unsigned version. Since the have been several bug reports in the past concerning correct 64-bit division on 32-bit platforms I added some long over due regression tests. Much to my surprise the unsigned 64-bit division regression tests failed. This was surprising because __udivdi3() was implemented by simply calling div64_u64() which is provided by the kernel. This meant that the linux kernels 64-bit division algorithm on 32-bit platforms was flawed. After some investigation this turned out to be exactly the case. Because of this I was forced to abandon the kernel helper and instead to fully implement 64-bit division in the spl. There are several published implementation out there on how to do this properly and I settled on one proposed in the book Hacker's Delight. Their proposed algoritm is freely available without restriction and I have just modified it to be linux kernel friendly. The update implementation now passed all the unsigned and signed regression tests. This should be functional, but not fast, which is good enough for out purposes. If you want fast too I'd strongly suggest you upgrade to a 64-bit platform. I have also reported the kernel bug and we'll see if we can't get it fixed up stream.
2010-07-12 19:38:34 +00:00
#if defined(__arm) || defined(__arm__)
/*
* Implementation of 64-bit (un)signed division for 32-bit arm machines.
*
* Run-time ABI for the ARM Architecture (page 20). A pair of (unsigned)
* long longs is returned in {{r0, r1}, {r2,r3}}, the quotient in {r0, r1},
* and the remainder in {r2, r3}. The return type is specifically left
* set to 'void' to ensure the compiler does not overwrite these registers
* during the return. All results are in registers as per ABI
*/
void
__aeabi_uldivmod(uint64_t u, uint64_t v)
{
uint64_t res;
uint64_t mod;
res = __udivdi3(u, v);
mod = __umoddi3(u, v);
{
register uint32_t r0 asm("r0") = (res & 0xFFFFFFFF);
register uint32_t r1 asm("r1") = (res >> 32);
register uint32_t r2 asm("r2") = (mod & 0xFFFFFFFF);
register uint32_t r3 asm("r3") = (mod >> 32);
asm volatile(""
: "+r"(r0), "+r"(r1), "+r"(r2),"+r"(r3) /* output */
: "r"(r0), "r"(r1), "r"(r2), "r"(r3)); /* input */
return; /* r0; */
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__aeabi_uldivmod);
void
__aeabi_ldivmod(int64_t u, int64_t v)
{
int64_t res;
uint64_t mod;
res = __divdi3(u, v);
mod = __umoddi3(u, v);
{
register uint32_t r0 asm("r0") = (res & 0xFFFFFFFF);
register uint32_t r1 asm("r1") = (res >> 32);
register uint32_t r2 asm("r2") = (mod & 0xFFFFFFFF);
register uint32_t r3 asm("r3") = (mod >> 32);
asm volatile(""
: "+r"(r0), "+r"(r1), "+r"(r2),"+r"(r3) /* output */
: "r"(r0), "r"(r1), "r"(r2), "r"(r3)); /* input */
return; /* r0; */
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__aeabi_ldivmod);
#endif /* __arm || __arm__ */
#endif /* BITS_PER_LONG */
/* NOTE: The strtoxx behavior is solely based on my reading of the Solaris
* ddi_strtol(9F) man page. I have not verified the behavior of these
* functions against their Solaris counterparts. It is possible that I
* may have misinterpreted the man page or the man page is incorrect.
*/
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
int ddi_strtoul(const char *, char **, int, unsigned long *);
int ddi_strtol(const char *, char **, int, long *);
int ddi_strtoull(const char *, char **, int, unsigned long long *);
int ddi_strtoll(const char *, char **, int, long long *);
#define define_ddi_strtoux(type, valtype) \
int ddi_strtou##type(const char *str, char **endptr, \
int base, valtype *result) \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
{ \
valtype last_value, value = 0; \
char *ptr = (char *)str; \
int flag = 1, digit; \
\
if (strlen(ptr) == 0) \
return EINVAL; \
\
/* Auto-detect base based on prefix */ \
if (!base) { \
if (str[0] == '0') { \
if (tolower(str[1])=='x' && isxdigit(str[2])) { \
base = 16; /* hex */ \
ptr += 2; \
} else if (str[1] >= '0' && str[1] < 8) { \
base = 8; /* octal */ \
ptr += 1; \
} else { \
return EINVAL; \
} \
} else { \
base = 10; /* decimal */ \
} \
} \
\
while (1) { \
if (isdigit(*ptr)) \
digit = *ptr - '0'; \
else if (isalpha(*ptr)) \
digit = tolower(*ptr) - 'a' + 10; \
else \
break; \
\
if (digit >= base) \
break; \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
\
last_value = value; \
value = value * base + digit; \
if (last_value > value) /* Overflow */ \
return ERANGE; \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
\
flag = 1; \
ptr++; \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
} \
\
if (flag) \
*result = value; \
\
if (endptr) \
*endptr = (char *)(flag ? ptr : str); \
\
return 0; \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
} \
#define define_ddi_strtox(type, valtype) \
int ddi_strto##type(const char *str, char **endptr, \
int base, valtype *result) \
{ \
int rc; \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
\
if (*str == '-') { \
rc = ddi_strtou##type(str + 1, endptr, base, result); \
if (!rc) { \
if (*endptr == str + 1) \
*endptr = (char *)str; \
else \
*result = -*result; \
} \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
} else { \
rc = ddi_strtou##type(str, endptr, base, result); \
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
} \
\
return rc; \
}
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
define_ddi_strtoux(l, unsigned long)
define_ddi_strtox(l, long)
define_ddi_strtoux(ll, unsigned long long)
define_ddi_strtox(ll, long long)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ddi_strtoul);
2008-12-06 00:23:57 +00:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ddi_strtol);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ddi_strtoll);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ddi_strtoull);
int
ddi_copyin(const void *from, void *to, size_t len, int flags)
{
/* Fake ioctl() issued by kernel, 'from' is a kernel address */
if (flags & FKIOCTL) {
memcpy(to, from, len);
return 0;
}
return copyin(from, to, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ddi_copyin);
int
ddi_copyout(const void *from, void *to, size_t len, int flags)
{
/* Fake ioctl() issued by kernel, 'from' is a kernel address */
if (flags & FKIOCTL) {
memcpy(to, from, len);
return 0;
}
return copyout(from, to, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ddi_copyout);
Reimplement rwlocks for Linux lock profiling/analysis. It turns out that the previous rwlock implementation worked well but did not integrate properly with the upstream kernel lock profiling/ analysis tools. This is a major problem since it would be awfully nice to be able to use the automatic lock checker and profiler. The problem is that the upstream lock tools use the pre-processor to create a lock class for each uniquely named locked. Since the rwsem was embedded in a wrapper structure the name was always the same. The effect was that we only ended up with one lock class for the entire SPL which caused the lock dependency checker to flag nearly everything as a possible deadlock. The solution was to directly map a krwlock to a Linux rwsem using a typedef there by eliminating the wrapper structure. This was not done initially because the rwsem implementation is specific to the arch. To fully implement the Solaris krwlock API using only the provided rwsem API is not possible. It can only be done by directly accessing some of the internal data member of the rwsem structure. For example, the Linux API provides a different function for dropping a reader vs writer lock. Whereas the Solaris API uses the same function and the caller does not pass in what type of lock it is. This means to properly drop the lock we need to determine if the lock is currently a reader or writer lock. Then we need to call the proper Linux API function. Unfortunately, there is no provided API for this so we must extracted this information directly from arch specific lock implementation. This is all do able, and what I did, but it does complicate things considerably. The good news is that in addition to the profiling benefits of this change. We may see performance improvements due to slightly reduced overhead when creating rwlocks and manipulating them. The only function I was forced to sacrafice was rw_owner() because this information is simply not stored anywhere in the rwsem. Luckily this appears not to be a commonly used function on Solaris, and it is my understanding it is mainly used for debugging anyway. In addition to the core rwlock changes, extensive updates were made to the rwlock regression tests. Each class of test was extended to provide more API coverage and to be more rigerous in checking for misbehavior. This is a pretty significant change and with that in mind I have been careful to validate it on several platforms before committing. The full SPLAT regression test suite was run numberous times on all of the following platforms. This includes various kernels ranging from 2.6.16 to 2.6.29. - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-18 23:09:47 +00:00
#ifndef HAVE_PUT_TASK_STRUCT
/*
* This is only a stub function which should never be used. The SPL should
* never be putting away the last reference on a task structure so this will
* not be called. However, we still need to define it so the module does not
* have undefined symbol at load time. That all said if this impossible
* thing does somehow happen PANIC immediately so we know about it.
Reimplement rwlocks for Linux lock profiling/analysis. It turns out that the previous rwlock implementation worked well but did not integrate properly with the upstream kernel lock profiling/ analysis tools. This is a major problem since it would be awfully nice to be able to use the automatic lock checker and profiler. The problem is that the upstream lock tools use the pre-processor to create a lock class for each uniquely named locked. Since the rwsem was embedded in a wrapper structure the name was always the same. The effect was that we only ended up with one lock class for the entire SPL which caused the lock dependency checker to flag nearly everything as a possible deadlock. The solution was to directly map a krwlock to a Linux rwsem using a typedef there by eliminating the wrapper structure. This was not done initially because the rwsem implementation is specific to the arch. To fully implement the Solaris krwlock API using only the provided rwsem API is not possible. It can only be done by directly accessing some of the internal data member of the rwsem structure. For example, the Linux API provides a different function for dropping a reader vs writer lock. Whereas the Solaris API uses the same function and the caller does not pass in what type of lock it is. This means to properly drop the lock we need to determine if the lock is currently a reader or writer lock. Then we need to call the proper Linux API function. Unfortunately, there is no provided API for this so we must extracted this information directly from arch specific lock implementation. This is all do able, and what I did, but it does complicate things considerably. The good news is that in addition to the profiling benefits of this change. We may see performance improvements due to slightly reduced overhead when creating rwlocks and manipulating them. The only function I was forced to sacrafice was rw_owner() because this information is simply not stored anywhere in the rwsem. Luckily this appears not to be a commonly used function on Solaris, and it is my understanding it is mainly used for debugging anyway. In addition to the core rwlock changes, extensive updates were made to the rwlock regression tests. Each class of test was extended to provide more API coverage and to be more rigerous in checking for misbehavior. This is a pretty significant change and with that in mind I have been careful to validate it on several platforms before committing. The full SPLAT regression test suite was run numberous times on all of the following platforms. This includes various kernels ranging from 2.6.16 to 2.6.29. - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-18 23:09:47 +00:00
*/
void
__put_task_struct(struct task_struct *t)
{
PANIC("Unexpectly put last reference on task %d\n", (int)t->pid);
Reimplement rwlocks for Linux lock profiling/analysis. It turns out that the previous rwlock implementation worked well but did not integrate properly with the upstream kernel lock profiling/ analysis tools. This is a major problem since it would be awfully nice to be able to use the automatic lock checker and profiler. The problem is that the upstream lock tools use the pre-processor to create a lock class for each uniquely named locked. Since the rwsem was embedded in a wrapper structure the name was always the same. The effect was that we only ended up with one lock class for the entire SPL which caused the lock dependency checker to flag nearly everything as a possible deadlock. The solution was to directly map a krwlock to a Linux rwsem using a typedef there by eliminating the wrapper structure. This was not done initially because the rwsem implementation is specific to the arch. To fully implement the Solaris krwlock API using only the provided rwsem API is not possible. It can only be done by directly accessing some of the internal data member of the rwsem structure. For example, the Linux API provides a different function for dropping a reader vs writer lock. Whereas the Solaris API uses the same function and the caller does not pass in what type of lock it is. This means to properly drop the lock we need to determine if the lock is currently a reader or writer lock. Then we need to call the proper Linux API function. Unfortunately, there is no provided API for this so we must extracted this information directly from arch specific lock implementation. This is all do able, and what I did, but it does complicate things considerably. The good news is that in addition to the profiling benefits of this change. We may see performance improvements due to slightly reduced overhead when creating rwlocks and manipulating them. The only function I was forced to sacrafice was rw_owner() because this information is simply not stored anywhere in the rwsem. Luckily this appears not to be a commonly used function on Solaris, and it is my understanding it is mainly used for debugging anyway. In addition to the core rwlock changes, extensive updates were made to the rwlock regression tests. Each class of test was extended to provide more API coverage and to be more rigerous in checking for misbehavior. This is a pretty significant change and with that in mind I have been careful to validate it on several platforms before committing. The full SPLAT regression test suite was run numberous times on all of the following platforms. This includes various kernels ranging from 2.6.16 to 2.6.29. - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-18 23:09:47 +00:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_task_struct);
#endif /* HAVE_PUT_TASK_STRUCT */
/*
* Read the unique system identifier from the /etc/hostid file.
*
* The behavior of /usr/bin/hostid on Linux systems with the
* regular eglibc and coreutils is:
*
* 1. Generate the value if the /etc/hostid file does not exist
* or if the /etc/hostid file is less than four bytes in size.
*
* 2. If the /etc/hostid file is at least 4 bytes, then return
* the first four bytes [0..3] in native endian order.
*
* 3. Always ignore bytes [4..] if they exist in the file.
*
* Only the first four bytes are significant, even on systems that
* have a 64-bit word size.
*
* See:
*
* eglibc: sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/gethostid.c
* coreutils: src/hostid.c
*
* Notes:
*
* The /etc/hostid file on Solaris is a text file that often reads:
*
* # DO NOT EDIT
* "0123456789"
*
* Directly copying this file to Linux results in a constant
* hostid of 4f442023 because the default comment constitutes
* the first four bytes of the file.
*
*/
char *spl_hostid_path = HW_HOSTID_PATH;
module_param(spl_hostid_path, charp, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(spl_hostid_path, "The system hostid file (/etc/hostid)");
static int
hostid_read(void)
{
int result;
uint64_t size;
struct _buf *file;
uint32_t hostid = 0;
file = kobj_open_file(spl_hostid_path);
if (file == (struct _buf *)-1)
return -1;
result = kobj_get_filesize(file, &size);
if (result != 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"SPL: kobj_get_filesize returned %i on %s\n",
result, spl_hostid_path);
kobj_close_file(file);
return -2;
}
if (size < sizeof(HW_HOSTID_MASK)) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"SPL: Ignoring the %s file because it is %llu bytes; "
"expecting %lu bytes instead.\n", spl_hostid_path,
size, (unsigned long)sizeof(HW_HOSTID_MASK));
kobj_close_file(file);
return -3;
}
/* Read directly into the variable like eglibc does. */
/* Short reads are okay; native behavior is preserved. */
result = kobj_read_file(file, (char *)&hostid, sizeof(hostid), 0);
if (result < 0) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"SPL: kobj_read_file returned %i on %s\n",
result, spl_hostid_path);
kobj_close_file(file);
return -4;
}
/* Mask down to 32 bits like coreutils does. */
spl_hostid = hostid & HW_HOSTID_MASK;
kobj_close_file(file);
return 0;
}
uint32_t
zone_get_hostid(void *zone)
{
static int first = 1;
/* Only the global zone is supported */
ASSERT(zone == NULL);
if (first) {
first = 0;
spl_hostid &= HW_HOSTID_MASK;
/*
* Get the hostid if it was not passed as a module parameter.
* Try reading the /etc/hostid file directly.
*/
if (spl_hostid == 0 && hostid_read())
spl_hostid = 0;
printk(KERN_NOTICE "SPL: using hostid 0x%08x\n",
(unsigned int) spl_hostid);
}
return spl_hostid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(zone_get_hostid);
static int
spl_kvmem_init(void)
{
int rc = 0;
rc = spl_kmem_init();
if (rc)
return (rc);
rc = spl_vmem_init();
if (rc) {
spl_kmem_fini();
return (rc);
}
return (rc);
}
random_get_pseudo_bytes() need not provide cryptographic strength entropy Perf profiling of dd on a zvol revealed that my system spent 3.16% of its time in random_get_pseudo_bytes(). No SPL consumers need cryptographic strength entropy, so we can reduce our overhead by changing the implementation to utilize a fast PRNG. The Linux kernel did not export a suitable PRNG function until it exported get_random_int() in Linux 3.10. While we could implement an autotools check so that we use it when it is available or even try to access the symbol on older kernels where it is not exported using the fact that it is exported on newer ones as justification, we can instead implement our own pseudo-random data generator. For this purpose, I have written one based on a 128-bit pseudo-random number generator proposed in a paper by Sebastiano Vigna that itself was based on work by the late George Marsaglia. http://vigna.di.unimi.it/ftp/papers/xorshiftplus.pdf Profiling the same benchmark with an earlier variant of this patch that used a slightly different generator (roughly same number of instructions) by the same author showed that time spent in random_get_pseudo_bytes() dropped to 0.06%. That is a factor of 50 improvement. This particular generator algorithm is also well known to be fast: http://xorshift.di.unimi.it/#speed The benchmark numbers there state that it runs at 1.12ns/64-bits or 7.14 GBps of throughput on an Intel Core i7-4770 in what is presumably a single-threaded context. Using it in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in the manner I have will probably not reach that level of performance, but it should be fairly high and many times higher than the Linux `get_random_bytes()` function that we use now, which runs at 16.3 MB/s on my Intel Xeon E3-1276v3 processor when measured by using dd on /dev/urandom. Also, putting this generator's seed into per-CPU variables allows us to eliminate overhead from both spin locks and CPU memory barriers, which is NUMA friendly. We could have alternatively modified consumers to use something like `gethrtime() % 3` as suggested by both Matthew Ahrens and Tim Chase, but that has a few potential problems that this approach avoids: 1. Switching to `gethrtime() % 3` in hot code paths today requires diverging from illumos-gate and does nothing about potential future patches from illumos-gate that call our slow `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in different hot code paths. Reimplementing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with a per-CPU PRNG avoids both of those things entirely, which means less work for us in the future. 2. Looking at the code that implements `gethrtime()`, I think it is unlikely to be faster than this per-CPU PRNG implementation of `random_get_pseudo_bytes()`. It would be best to go with something fast now so that there is no point in revisiting this from a performance perspective. 3. `gethrtime() % 3` can vary in behavior from system to system based on kernel version, architecture and clock source. In comparison, this per-CPU PRNG is about ~40 lines of code in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` that should behave consistently across all systems regardless of kernel version, system architecture or machine clock source. It is unlikely that we would ever need to revisit this per-CPU PRNG while the same cannot be said for `gethrtime() % 3`. 4. `gethrtime()` uses CPU memory barriers and maybe atomic instructions depending on the clock source, so replacing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with `gethrtime()` in hot code paths could still require a future person working on NUMA scalability to reimplement it anyway while this per-CPU PRNG would not by virtue of using neither CPU memory barriers nor atomic instructions. Note that I did not check various clock sources for the presence of atomic instructions. There is simply too much code to read and given the drawbacks versus this per-cpu PRNG, there is no point in being certain. 5. I have heard of instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers caused problems for HPC code in ways that took more than a year to identify and were remedied by switching to a higher quality source of pseudo-random numbers. While filesystems are different than HPC code, I do not think it is impossible for us to have instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems. Opting for a well studied PRNG algorithm that passes tests for statistical randomness over changing callers to use `gethrtime() % 3` bypasses the need to think about both whether poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems and the statistical quality of numbers from `gethrtime() % 3`. 6. `gethrtime()` calls `getrawmonotonic()`, which uses seqlocks. This is probably not a huge issue, but anyone using kgdb would never be able to step through a seqlock critical section, which is not a problem either now or with the per-CPU PRNG: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seqlock The only downside that I can see is that this code's memory requirement is O(N) where N is NR_CPUS, versus the current code and `gethrtime() % 3`, which are O(1), but that should not be a problem. The seeds will use 64KB of memory at the high end (i.e `NR_CPU == 4096`) and 16 bytes of memory at the low end (i.e. `NR_CPU == 1`). In either case, we should only use a few hundred bytes of code for text, especially since `spl_rand_jump()` should be inlined into `spl_random_init()`, which should be removed during early boot as part of "Freeing unused kernel memory". In either case, the memory requirements are minuscule. Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com> Closes #372
2014-07-11 22:36:28 +00:00
/*
* We initialize the random number generator with 128 bits of entropy from the
* system random number generator. In the improbable case that we have a zero
* seed, we fallback to the system jiffies, unless it is also zero, in which
* situation we use a preprogrammed seed. We step forward by 2^64 iterations to
* initialize each of the per-cpu seeds so that the sequences generated on each
* CPU are guaranteed to never overlap in practice.
*/
static void __init
spl_random_init(void)
{
uint64_t s[2];
int i;
get_random_bytes(s, sizeof (s));
if (s[0] == 0 && s[1] == 0) {
if (jiffies != 0) {
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = ~0 - jiffies;
} else {
(void) memcpy(s, "improbable seed", sizeof (s));
}
printk("SPL: get_random_bytes() returned 0 "
"when generating random seed. Setting initial seed to "
"0x%016llx%016llx.", cpu_to_be64(s[0]), cpu_to_be64(s[1]));
}
for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) {
uint64_t *wordp = per_cpu(spl_pseudo_entropy, i);
spl_rand_jump(s);
wordp[0] = s[0];
wordp[1] = s[1];
}
}
static void
spl_kvmem_fini(void)
{
spl_vmem_fini();
spl_kmem_fini();
}
static int __init
spl_init(void)
{
int rc = 0;
random_get_pseudo_bytes() need not provide cryptographic strength entropy Perf profiling of dd on a zvol revealed that my system spent 3.16% of its time in random_get_pseudo_bytes(). No SPL consumers need cryptographic strength entropy, so we can reduce our overhead by changing the implementation to utilize a fast PRNG. The Linux kernel did not export a suitable PRNG function until it exported get_random_int() in Linux 3.10. While we could implement an autotools check so that we use it when it is available or even try to access the symbol on older kernels where it is not exported using the fact that it is exported on newer ones as justification, we can instead implement our own pseudo-random data generator. For this purpose, I have written one based on a 128-bit pseudo-random number generator proposed in a paper by Sebastiano Vigna that itself was based on work by the late George Marsaglia. http://vigna.di.unimi.it/ftp/papers/xorshiftplus.pdf Profiling the same benchmark with an earlier variant of this patch that used a slightly different generator (roughly same number of instructions) by the same author showed that time spent in random_get_pseudo_bytes() dropped to 0.06%. That is a factor of 50 improvement. This particular generator algorithm is also well known to be fast: http://xorshift.di.unimi.it/#speed The benchmark numbers there state that it runs at 1.12ns/64-bits or 7.14 GBps of throughput on an Intel Core i7-4770 in what is presumably a single-threaded context. Using it in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in the manner I have will probably not reach that level of performance, but it should be fairly high and many times higher than the Linux `get_random_bytes()` function that we use now, which runs at 16.3 MB/s on my Intel Xeon E3-1276v3 processor when measured by using dd on /dev/urandom. Also, putting this generator's seed into per-CPU variables allows us to eliminate overhead from both spin locks and CPU memory barriers, which is NUMA friendly. We could have alternatively modified consumers to use something like `gethrtime() % 3` as suggested by both Matthew Ahrens and Tim Chase, but that has a few potential problems that this approach avoids: 1. Switching to `gethrtime() % 3` in hot code paths today requires diverging from illumos-gate and does nothing about potential future patches from illumos-gate that call our slow `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` in different hot code paths. Reimplementing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with a per-CPU PRNG avoids both of those things entirely, which means less work for us in the future. 2. Looking at the code that implements `gethrtime()`, I think it is unlikely to be faster than this per-CPU PRNG implementation of `random_get_pseudo_bytes()`. It would be best to go with something fast now so that there is no point in revisiting this from a performance perspective. 3. `gethrtime() % 3` can vary in behavior from system to system based on kernel version, architecture and clock source. In comparison, this per-CPU PRNG is about ~40 lines of code in `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` that should behave consistently across all systems regardless of kernel version, system architecture or machine clock source. It is unlikely that we would ever need to revisit this per-CPU PRNG while the same cannot be said for `gethrtime() % 3`. 4. `gethrtime()` uses CPU memory barriers and maybe atomic instructions depending on the clock source, so replacing `random_get_pseudo_bytes()` with `gethrtime()` in hot code paths could still require a future person working on NUMA scalability to reimplement it anyway while this per-CPU PRNG would not by virtue of using neither CPU memory barriers nor atomic instructions. Note that I did not check various clock sources for the presence of atomic instructions. There is simply too much code to read and given the drawbacks versus this per-cpu PRNG, there is no point in being certain. 5. I have heard of instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers caused problems for HPC code in ways that took more than a year to identify and were remedied by switching to a higher quality source of pseudo-random numbers. While filesystems are different than HPC code, I do not think it is impossible for us to have instances where poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems. Opting for a well studied PRNG algorithm that passes tests for statistical randomness over changing callers to use `gethrtime() % 3` bypasses the need to think about both whether poor quality pseudo-random numbers can cause problems and the statistical quality of numbers from `gethrtime() % 3`. 6. `gethrtime()` calls `getrawmonotonic()`, which uses seqlocks. This is probably not a huge issue, but anyone using kgdb would never be able to step through a seqlock critical section, which is not a problem either now or with the per-CPU PRNG: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seqlock The only downside that I can see is that this code's memory requirement is O(N) where N is NR_CPUS, versus the current code and `gethrtime() % 3`, which are O(1), but that should not be a problem. The seeds will use 64KB of memory at the high end (i.e `NR_CPU == 4096`) and 16 bytes of memory at the low end (i.e. `NR_CPU == 1`). In either case, we should only use a few hundred bytes of code for text, especially since `spl_rand_jump()` should be inlined into `spl_random_init()`, which should be removed during early boot as part of "Freeing unused kernel memory". In either case, the memory requirements are minuscule. Signed-off-by: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Signed-off-by: Tim Chase <tim@chase2k.com> Closes #372
2014-07-11 22:36:28 +00:00
spl_random_init();
if ((rc = spl_kvmem_init()))
goto out1;
if ((rc = spl_mutex_init()))
goto out2;
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
if ((rc = spl_rw_init()))
goto out3;
if ((rc = spl_tsd_init()))
goto out4;
if ((rc = spl_taskq_init()))
goto out5;
if ((rc = spl_kmem_cache_init()))
goto out6;
2009-01-05 23:08:03 +00:00
if ((rc = spl_vn_init()))
goto out7;
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
if ((rc = spl_proc_init()))
goto out8;
Add Thread Specific Data (TSD) Implementation Thread specific data has implemented using a hash table, this avoids the need to add a member to the task structure and allows maximum portability between kernels. This implementation has been optimized to keep the tsd_set() and tsd_get() times as small as possible. The majority of the entries in the hash table are for specific tsd entries. These entries are hashed by the product of their key and pid because by design the key and pid are guaranteed to be unique. Their product also has the desirable properly that it will be uniformly distributed over the hash bins providing neither the pid nor key is zero. Under linux the zero pid is always the init process and thus won't be used, and this implementation is careful to never to assign a zero key. By default the hash table is sized to 512 bins which is expected to be sufficient for light to moderate usage of thread specific data. The hash table contains two additional type of entries. They first type is entry is called a 'key' entry and it is added to the hash during tsd_create(). It is used to store the address of the destructor function and it is used as an anchor point. All tsd entries which use the same key will be linked to this entry. This is used during tsd_destory() to quickly call the destructor function for all tsd associated with the key. The 'key' entry may be looked up with tsd_hash_search() by passing the key you wish to lookup and DTOR_PID constant as the pid. The second type of entry is called a 'pid' entry and it is added to the hash the first time a process set a key. The 'pid' entry is also used as an anchor and all tsd for the process will be linked to it. This list is using during tsd_exit() to ensure all registered destructors are run for the process. The 'pid' entry may be looked up with tsd_hash_search() by passing the PID_KEY constant as the key, and the process pid. Note that tsd_exit() is called by thread_exit() so if your using the Solaris thread API you should not need to call tsd_exit() directly.
2010-11-30 17:51:46 +00:00
if ((rc = spl_kstat_init()))
goto out9;
if ((rc = spl_zlib_init()))
goto out10;
printk(KERN_NOTICE "SPL: Loaded module v%s-%s%s\n", SPL_META_VERSION,
SPL_META_RELEASE, SPL_DEBUG_STR);
return (rc);
out10:
spl_kstat_fini();
Add Thread Specific Data (TSD) Implementation Thread specific data has implemented using a hash table, this avoids the need to add a member to the task structure and allows maximum portability between kernels. This implementation has been optimized to keep the tsd_set() and tsd_get() times as small as possible. The majority of the entries in the hash table are for specific tsd entries. These entries are hashed by the product of their key and pid because by design the key and pid are guaranteed to be unique. Their product also has the desirable properly that it will be uniformly distributed over the hash bins providing neither the pid nor key is zero. Under linux the zero pid is always the init process and thus won't be used, and this implementation is careful to never to assign a zero key. By default the hash table is sized to 512 bins which is expected to be sufficient for light to moderate usage of thread specific data. The hash table contains two additional type of entries. They first type is entry is called a 'key' entry and it is added to the hash during tsd_create(). It is used to store the address of the destructor function and it is used as an anchor point. All tsd entries which use the same key will be linked to this entry. This is used during tsd_destory() to quickly call the destructor function for all tsd associated with the key. The 'key' entry may be looked up with tsd_hash_search() by passing the key you wish to lookup and DTOR_PID constant as the pid. The second type of entry is called a 'pid' entry and it is added to the hash the first time a process set a key. The 'pid' entry is also used as an anchor and all tsd for the process will be linked to it. This list is using during tsd_exit() to ensure all registered destructors are run for the process. The 'pid' entry may be looked up with tsd_hash_search() by passing the PID_KEY constant as the key, and the process pid. Note that tsd_exit() is called by thread_exit() so if your using the Solaris thread API you should not need to call tsd_exit() directly.
2010-11-30 17:51:46 +00:00
out9:
spl_proc_fini();
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
out8:
spl_vn_fini();
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
out7:
spl_kmem_cache_fini();
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
out6:
2009-01-05 23:08:03 +00:00
spl_taskq_fini();
out5:
spl_tsd_fini();
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
out4:
spl_rw_fini();
out3:
spl_mutex_fini();
out2:
spl_kvmem_fini();
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
out1:
printk(KERN_NOTICE "SPL: Failed to Load Solaris Porting Layer "
"v%s-%s%s, rc = %d\n", SPL_META_VERSION, SPL_META_RELEASE,
SPL_DEBUG_STR, rc);
return (rc);
}
static void __exit
spl_fini(void)
{
printk(KERN_NOTICE "SPL: Unloaded module v%s-%s%s\n",
SPL_META_VERSION, SPL_META_RELEASE, SPL_DEBUG_STR);
spl_zlib_fini();
spl_kstat_fini();
spl_proc_fini();
spl_vn_fini();
spl_kmem_cache_fini();
2009-01-05 23:08:03 +00:00
spl_taskq_fini();
spl_tsd_fini();
Update rwlocks to track owner to ensure correct semantics The behavior of RW_*_HELD was updated because it was not quite right. It is not sufficient to return non-zero when the lock is help, we must only do this when the current task in the holder. This means we need to track the lock owner which is not something tracked in a Linux semaphore. After some experimentation the solution I settled on was to embed the Linux semaphore at the start of a larger krwlock_t structure which includes the owner field. This maintains good performance and allows us to cleanly intergrate with the kernel lock analysis tools. My reasons: 1) By placing the Linux semaphore at the start of krwlock_t we can then simply cast krwlock_t to a rw_semaphore and pass that on to the linux kernel. This allows us to use '#defines so the preprocessor can do direct replacement of the Solaris primative with the linux equivilant. This is important because it then maintains the location information for each rw_* call point. 2) Additionally, by adding the owner to krwlock_t we can keep this needed extra information adjacent to the lock itself. This removes the need for a fancy lookup to get the owner which is optimal for performance. We can also leverage the existing spin lock in the semaphore to ensure owner is updated correctly. 3) All helper functions which do not need to strictly be implemented as a define to preserve location information can be done as a static inline function. 4) Adding the owner to krwlock_t allows us to remove all memory allocations done during lock initialization. This is good for all the obvious reasons, we do give up the ability to specific the lock name. The Linux profiling tools will stringify the lock name used in the code via the preprocessor and use that. Update rwlocks validated on: - SLES10 (ppc64) - SLES11 (x86_64) - CHAOS4.2 (x86_64) - RHEL5.3 (x86_64) - RHEL6 (x86_64) - FC11 (x86_64)
2009-09-25 21:14:35 +00:00
spl_rw_fini();
spl_mutex_fini();
spl_kvmem_fini();
}
module_init(spl_init);
module_exit(spl_fini);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Solaris Porting Layer");
MODULE_AUTHOR(SPL_META_AUTHOR);
MODULE_LICENSE(SPL_META_LICENSE);
MODULE_VERSION(SPL_META_VERSION "-" SPL_META_RELEASE);