zfs/include/sys/zio_crypt.h

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Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
/*
* CDDL HEADER START
*
* This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the
* Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0.
* You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version
* 1.0 of the CDDL.
*
* A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this
* source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at
* http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL.
*
* CDDL HEADER END
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_ZIO_CRYPT_H
#define _SYS_ZIO_CRYPT_H
#include <sys/dmu.h>
#include <sys/refcount.h>
#include <sys/crypto/api.h>
#include <sys/nvpair.h>
#include <sys/avl.h>
#include <sys/zio.h>
/* forward declarations */
struct zbookmark_phys;
#define WRAPPING_KEY_LEN 32
#define WRAPPING_IV_LEN ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN
#define WRAPPING_MAC_LEN ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
#define MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN 32
#define SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN 64
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
typedef enum zio_crypt_type {
ZC_TYPE_NONE = 0,
ZC_TYPE_CCM,
ZC_TYPE_GCM
} zio_crypt_type_t;
/* table of supported crypto algorithms, modes and keylengths. */
typedef struct zio_crypt_info {
/* mechanism name, needed by ICP */
crypto_mech_name_t ci_mechname;
/* cipher mode type (GCM, CCM) */
zio_crypt_type_t ci_crypt_type;
/* length of the encryption key */
size_t ci_keylen;
/* human-readable name of the encryption alforithm */
char *ci_name;
} zio_crypt_info_t;
extern zio_crypt_info_t zio_crypt_table[ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS];
/* in memory representation of an unwrapped key that is loaded into memory */
typedef struct zio_crypt_key {
/* encryption algorithm */
uint64_t zk_crypt;
/* GUID for uniquely identifying this key. Not encrypted on disk. */
uint64_t zk_guid;
/* buffer for master key */
uint8_t zk_master_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
/* buffer for hmac key */
uint8_t zk_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN];
/* buffer for currrent encryption key derived from master key */
uint8_t zk_current_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN];
/* current 64 bit salt for deriving an encryption key */
uint8_t zk_salt[ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN];
/* count of how many times the current salt has been used */
uint64_t zk_salt_count;
/* illumos crypto api current encryption key */
crypto_key_t zk_current_key;
/* template of current encryption key for illumos crypto api */
crypto_ctx_template_t zk_current_tmpl;
/* illumos crypto api current hmac key */
crypto_key_t zk_hmac_key;
/* template of hmac key for illumos crypto api */
crypto_ctx_template_t zk_hmac_tmpl;
/* lock for changing the salt and dependant values */
krwlock_t zk_salt_lock;
} zio_crypt_key_t;
void zio_crypt_key_destroy(zio_crypt_key_t *key);
int zio_crypt_key_init(uint64_t crypt, zio_crypt_key_t *key);
int zio_crypt_key_get_salt(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *salt_out);
int zio_crypt_key_wrap(crypto_key_t *cwkey, zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *iv,
uint8_t *mac, uint8_t *keydata_out, uint8_t *hmac_keydata_out);
int zio_crypt_key_unwrap(crypto_key_t *cwkey, uint64_t crypt, uint64_t guid,
uint8_t *keydata, uint8_t *hmac_keydata, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac,
zio_crypt_key_t *key);
int zio_crypt_generate_iv(uint8_t *ivbuf);
int zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data,
uint_t datalen, uint8_t *ivbuf, uint8_t *salt);
void zio_crypt_encode_params_bp(blkptr_t *bp, uint8_t *salt, uint8_t *iv);
void zio_crypt_decode_params_bp(const blkptr_t *bp, uint8_t *salt, uint8_t *iv);
void zio_crypt_encode_mac_bp(blkptr_t *bp, uint8_t *mac);
void zio_crypt_decode_mac_bp(const blkptr_t *bp, uint8_t *mac);
void zio_crypt_encode_mac_zil(void *data, uint8_t *mac);
void zio_crypt_decode_mac_zil(const void *data, uint8_t *mac);
void zio_crypt_copy_dnode_bonus(abd_t *src_abd, uint8_t *dst, uint_t datalen);
int zio_crypt_do_indirect_mac_checksum(boolean_t generate, void *buf,
uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap, uint8_t *cksum);
int zio_crypt_do_indirect_mac_checksum_abd(boolean_t generate, abd_t *abd,
uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap, uint8_t *cksum);
int zio_crypt_do_hmac(zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *data, uint_t datalen,
uint8_t *digestbuf, uint_t digestlen);
Native Encryption for ZFS on Linux This change incorporates three major pieces: The first change is a keystore that manages wrapping and encryption keys for encrypted datasets. These commands mostly involve manipulating the new DSL Crypto Key ZAP Objects that live in the MOS. Each encrypted dataset has its own DSL Crypto Key that is protected with a user's key. This level of indirection allows users to change their keys without re-encrypting their entire datasets. The change implements the new subcommands "zfs load-key", "zfs unload-key" and "zfs change-key" which allow the user to manage their encryption keys and settings. In addition, several new flags and properties have been added to allow dataset creation and to make mounting and unmounting more convenient. The second piece of this patch provides the ability to encrypt, decyrpt, and authenticate protected datasets. Each object set maintains a Merkel tree of Message Authentication Codes that protect the lower layers, similarly to how checksums are maintained. This part impacts the zio layer, which handles the actual encryption and generation of MACs, as well as the ARC and DMU, which need to be able to handle encrypted buffers and protected data. The last addition is the ability to do raw, encrypted sends and receives. The idea here is to send raw encrypted and compressed data and receive it exactly as is on a backup system. This means that the dataset on the receiving system is protected using the same user key that is in use on the sending side. By doing so, datasets can be efficiently backed up to an untrusted system without fear of data being compromised. Reviewed by: Matthew Ahrens <mahrens@delphix.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov> Reviewed-by: Jorgen Lundman <lundman@lundman.net> Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com> Closes #494 Closes #5769
2017-08-14 17:36:48 +00:00
int zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(zio_crypt_key_t *key, void *data, uint_t datalen,
boolean_t byteswap, uint8_t *portable_mac, uint8_t *local_mac);
int zio_do_crypt_data(boolean_t encrypt, zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *salt,
dmu_object_type_t ot, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen,
boolean_t byteswap, uint8_t *plainbuf, uint8_t *cipherbuf,
boolean_t *no_crypt);
int zio_do_crypt_abd(boolean_t encrypt, zio_crypt_key_t *key, uint8_t *salt,
dmu_object_type_t ot, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen,
boolean_t byteswap, abd_t *pabd, abd_t *cabd, boolean_t *no_crypt);
#endif